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I Crim. No. 562L fa Bank. .JII". :?H. Wh5·1 
THE PEOPJJg, Uespondcnt, v. JOHNSON WiLLIAM 
CALD'VEIJL, Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Murder-Killing hy Torture.-Physical suffering, a 
concomitant of almost all violent deaths, is not enough by 
itself to show murder by torture; there must also be intent 
that victim shall suffer. 
f2] Id.-Murder-Killing by Strangulation.-Murder by stl'angu-
lation indicates malice, but it does not by itself indicate intent 
to make victim suffer. 
l3] Id.-Murder-Deliberation and Premeditation.-A verdict of 
first degree murder for a slaying not committed in perpetrn-
tion of certain enumerated crimes or by means enumerated 
in Pen. Code, § 189, is proper only if slayer killed as result 
of careful thought and weighing of considerations, as a de-
liberate judgment or plan, carried on coolly and steadily, 
especially according to a preconceived design. 
[11] Id.-Murder-Deliberation and Premeditation.-Use of "wil-
ful, deliberate and premeditated" in Pen. Code, § 189, defining 
first degree murder, indicates that Legislature meant, by 
reiteration, to emphasize its intent to require, as element of 
such offense, considerably more reflection than mere amount 
of thought necessary to form intention. 
[5] Id.-Murder-Deliberation and Premeditation.-U evidence in 
murder case showed no more than infliction of multiple acts 
of violence on victim, it would not be sufficient to show that 
killing was result of careful thought and weighing of con-
siderations. 
[6] Id.-Evidence-Intent and Deliberation.-'fhe deliberation or 
premeditation required to sustain conviction of first degree 
murder in uxoricide case is sufficiently shown by evidence that 
defendant had made prior threats to "knock the old bag in 
the head and take off" and to "do her up," that his last thl'eat 
before he entered house with his wife on day of homicide 
was followed by approximately an hour of argument over 
whether or not he should leave her, that this argument termi· 
nated in the killing, and that defendant did not terminate 
his attack on his wife after he had sufficiently disabled her 
so that he could be free to leave as be testified he wanted 
to do, but continued attack uutil it culminated in her strangu-
lation. 
[IJ See Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 12 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide, 
§ 15. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Homicide, § 15; (3-5] Homicide, 
§ 15(2); (6] Homicide, § 158. 
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.APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b» from a judgment of the Superior Court of River-
side County. Russell S. Waite, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
death penalty, affirmed. 
Rubin Tepper, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Norman H. 
Sokolow, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J .-Defendant was charged by information 
. with the murder of his wife, Lily Pearl Storts Caldwell, and 
with four previous convictions of felony. He pleaded not 
guilty to the charge of murder, admitted the convictions. 
and waived trial by jury. The court found him guilty of 
murder in the first degree and. sentenced him to death. 
This appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
In early February, 1954, defendant informed the Arkansas 
State Police that he had killed his wife in Riverside, Cali-
fornia. An investigation followed and her body was found 
in the bathtub in her Riverside cabin. She had been dead 
for about five days. The autopsy surgeon testified that th~ 
body disclosed a single long laceration of the scalp, extending 
to but not through the bones of the skull. Round the neck 
were two belts. A torn piece of cloth belt, brokeJ. at the 
buckle and large enough only to encircle the neck, was next 
to the skin and over that was a tightly drawn plastic belt. 
It was the opinion of the surgeon that the cause of death 
was asphyxiation by strangulation, and that the lacerati~. 
though inflicted immediately before strangulation, vu 40t 
a contributing cause of death. In the main bedroom were a 
2-foot length of iron pipe, two pieces from the cloth belt 
that encircled the decedent's throat, and mopped-up blood 
staIns. A small black purse was on the bed. It was identified 
: as one the decedent usually kept on her person and in which 
she usually kept her money. Bedclothing, drapes, wearing 
apparel, extra bed springs, boxes, a large can, and miscel-
laneous articles were piled about the two bedrooms. 
In early January, 1954, defendant rented a cabin from 
Lily. Within three days, defendant, who was 32 Yf'ars (.ld, 
. married Lily, who was 40 to 50 years old and weighed 235 
a C.2d-J8 
-) 
) 
) 
866 PEOPLE v. CALDWELL [43 C.2d 
pounds. Defendant testified that the marriage occurred after 
a drinking party, that everyone at the time was intoxicated, 
that he did not know why he married Lily, and that she 
seemed to be willing to spend her money on him in an effort 
to have a good time. Prosecution witnesses testified that 
defendant had told them that he had married Lily for her 
money and property. During his extradition to California, 
he stated that Lily had her eye on a young man, and that 
he had his eye on her money. 
The marriage was marked by quarrels, attempted separa-
tions, and defendant's steady drinking. He testified· that 
he was annoyed and embarrassed by her penuriousness, pro-
nounced sexual desires, and her· insistence that he remain 
with her constantly rather than work or visit others. Prosecu-
ti8n witnesses related several conversations in which defend-
ant uttered threatening words against Lily. Two or three 
weeks after the marriage, Lily had called to defendant, "Come 
on, Daddy, let's go." Defendant said to a neighbor, "I'm 
a little fed up with it," and continued that he would, "take 
her in and do her up." On another occasion, he complained 
that Lily did not give him money, and said, "As soon as 
she gets me some more money, I am going to do her in." 
At a party in celebration of the marriage, defendant was 
heard to tell others that he was "getting tired of it," and 
that he was going to "knock the old bag in the head and 
take off." On the morning of the murder, the witnesses agreed 
that defendant and Lily had argued, but they disagreed as 
to whether he again expressed an intention to "do her up." 
On the occasion of each of these threats, defendant was 
described as drinking, drunk, smelling of alcohol, "tight," 
"a little off," "pretty well tight," "a little high," "just 
there and drinking," and "pretty much drunk." On cross-
examination, one witness stated that he did not regard these 
remarks as serious; no one ever bothered to mention them 
to Lily. 
Defendant testified that one week before the killing he 
h.ad attempted to I~ave Lily and that sne spent the afternoon 
following him, first to his sister's home, then to that of a 
neighbor, pleading with him to return. That evening they 
took an auto trip with a neighboring- couple, but continued 
to argue. Lily accused defendant of incpgt with his sister; 
he struck her in the eye and began to strangle her, but was 
stopp<,d by the other man in the car. 
On the day befo·re the killing, defendant asked Lily to 
supply bail for his friend Cecil, who was in jail. He became 
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angry when sh" rl,rm~p.d, st.at.ing that. hp. waR "rrf'f fy ,,",,11 
fed up," and that he wonld "knock hpf in t.he hrac1." AeCOlll 
panied by Cecil's wiff', \ViJmH, deff'ndant Jeft to raise bail 
money, but failing in that objl'ctive or forgetting it, he 
and Wilma spent the night together drinking at various publi(~ 
places and later lodging at a motel. They spoke of going 
to Texas together, but never reached an agreement. On the 
morning of the killing, defendant and Wilma went to his 
sister's home, to a cafe, and then to Lily's cabin. Defendant 
testified that he and Wilma commenced drinking immediately 
upon awakening. According to both defendant and Wilma, 
upon arriving at his sister's home, defendant learned that 
Lily had left most of his clothes there and had told his sister 
that the marriage was over. Defendant said that he "was 
glad of it" but that he wanted to get a pair of pants and 
a shirt that Lily had kept. He and 'Vilma went to Lily's 
cabin after stopping for a short time at a cafe. The waitress 
there testified that defendant bought no drinks, and although 
he appeared to have been drinki"ng, he was not boisterous 
but was laughing and having a good time. Arriving at 
Lily's cabin, defendant and Wilma found that Lily had just 
awakened, and that she was angry. She said, "I am glad 
yon got what you wanted." At that point, Cecil and two 
other persons drove up to the cabin. Defendant asked, "Can 
we come in and make some coffee T" Lily said, "No." Wilma 
and Ray, one of those who had just arrived, both testified 
that Lily and defendant began to argue, but they disagreed 
as to what was said. Ray asserted, "He said he was going 
to take her in and do her up." Wilma testified that de-
fendant asked, "Do you want me to stay T " that Lily replied, 
"Yes," and that he said, "All right, all right, I guess so." 
Defendant testified that he and Lily argued, but asserted 
that she pleaded with him to remain with her, but that he 
insisted on leaving. Ray testified that defendant was "pretty 
much" drunk and "tight" at the time. Shortly thereafter, 
Wil.m.a.,; Cecil, Ray., and the other visitor m-ove awa.y lea:vmtl 
defendant and Lily arguing. 
Defendant testified that the argument continued, that he 
tried to get his clothes and leave, that Lily grabbed them 
from him, that he hit her with his fist and then, grabbing 
a piece of pipe from the bedroom floor, hit her on the head. 
Tn one of his admissions during the trip from Arkansas to 
California he said that he then helped IJily to her feet, 
guided, punched, and pushed her to the bathroom, pushed 
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III'" illto niP tllh, lock('d thp bathroom door, and Idt th" 
premi:'lf's. At. tlw trinl h(' testified, "I know I just went 
crazy. (hit h('r on the jaw and knocked her down., and 
she got up and turned around and carne at me with her 
hand raised. 'Yell, I hit her again; and this little old pipe 
was there ... I grabbed that, and I remember hitting her 
one time." He testified that he did not remember much 
after that, except that he shut the bathroom door when Lily 
was in the tub, took $24 from Lily's small purse, looked 
lInder the front room couch for more money, and departed 
in IJily's car. He asserted in his deposition given in Arkansas, 
in his admissions during the trip from Arkansas to California. 
Ilnd in his testimony at the trial that he did not remember 
putting the belts on his wife's neck. He did admit, however, 
that he could have strangled her, but that he did not remem-
her it. 
In the afternoon of the day of the killing, defendant met 
Cecil and Wilma at a cafe. He was asked about blood on 
h is clothes, and replied that he had punched his wife in 
t he nose. The waitress testified that he appeared to have 
been drinking, was in a good mood, bought three beers, and 
offered to sell her a piano and a lawnmower. When asked 
about his wife, he declared, "She is passed out; she is all 
sprawled out." Defendant testified that he did not return 
to Lily's cabin, but a neighbor testified that he saw defendant 
on the front porch between 9 :30 and 10 that night, and 
that shortly thereafter Lily's auto was driven away. De-
fendant admitted selling a lawnmower that belonged to Lily 
and driving through Arizona, where he changed license plates, 
and into Arkansas, where he confessed when stopped for an 
auto registration inspection. He declared that he financed 
the trip by picking up hitchhikers and selling accessories 
from the automobile. 
The basic issue on this appeal is whether the killing was 
murder in the first degree. It was murder in the first degree 
if it was committed in the perpetration of robbery, committed 
by torture, or if it was wilful, deliberate, and premeditated. 
(Pen. Code, § 189.) The question of whether it was committed 
in the perpetration of robbery is not before us, since the 
trial court expressly withheld a decision on that question, 
stating that it was "unnecessary to decide, as a question 
of fact, at this time whether or not this killing was per-
petrated in an attempt to commit robbery, or in the 
commission of robbery or burglary, or any other offense." 
[1] Physical suffering, a concomitant of almost all violent 
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deaths, is not enough by itself to show murder by torture. 
There must also be intent that the victim shall suffer. (People 
v. Daugherty, 40 Ca1.2d 876 [256 P.2d 911J.) [2] Murder by 
strangulation indicates malice, but it does not by itself indio 
cate an intent to make the victim suffer. (People v. Bender, 
27 Ca1.2d 164, 177 [163 P.2d 8].) There is no evidence in 
this case that defendant had such intent. 
The judgment can be sustained, therefore, only if the 
evidence supports the conclusion that the killing was 
deliberate and premeditated. [3] A verdict of murder in 
the first degree for a slaying not committed in the perpetra-
tion of certain enumerated crimes, or by means enumerated 
in Penal Code section 189, is proper only if the slayer killed 
"as a result of careful thought and weighing of considera-
tions; as a deliberate judgment or plan; carried on coolly 
and steadily, esp. according to a preconceived design." 
(People v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 164, 183 [163 P.2d 8].) 
[4] ,. fi:urther, the use of 'wilful, deliberate, and premedi. 
tated' in conjunction would seem 'to indicate that the legis-
lature meant, by reiteration, to emphasize its intent to require, 
8S an element of first degree murder, considerably more 
reflection than the mere amount of thought necessary to form 
the intention." (People v. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d 59, 87 [153 
P.2d 21].) 
[5] If the evidence showed no more than the infliction 
of mUltiple acts of violence on the victim, it would not be 
sufficient to show that the killing was the result of careful 
thought and weighing of considerations. (People v. Tubby, 
34 Cal.2d 72, 78-79 [207 P.2d 51]; People v. Bender, 27 
Ca1.2d 164, 170, 186 [163 P.2d 8].) [6] In the present 
case, however, the circumstances attending the killing itself 
cannot be divorced from defendant's threats to "knock the old 
bag in the head and take oif," and to "do her up." Whetber 
or not these threats were the result of serious contemplation 
before they were made, they at least justify the inference 
that defendant considered killing his wife when he felt "fed 
up" and wished to leave her. Defendant's last threat before 
he entered the house with his wife on the day of the homicide 
was followed by approximately an hour of argument over 
whether or not he should leave her, and this argument termi· 
natf'd in the killing. The trial court could reasonably conclude 
that during this period, when defendant's thoughts were 
directed to the question of whether he should leave, he also 
weighed and considered the question of wbether he should 
... 
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kill. These questions had been associated in defenda::J.t's mind 
in the past, and there is no reason to believe that they were 
not so associated and reflected upon for the period of approxi-
mately an hour that he and his wife argued before her death. 
Our conclusion that the evidence supports the judgment is 
not inconsistent with People v. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d 59 [153 P.2d 
21]. It is true that in the Holt ease, as in this case, defendant 
threatened to kill the deceased approximately an hour before 
he did so. In the Holt case the court recognized that such 
a threat followed by a killing, standing alone, would justify 
a finding of first degree murder. There was other evidence 
in that ease, however, that did more than create a conflict 
with the inference that might be drawn from the threat 
followed by the killing; it was sufficient to establish as a 
matter of law that the threat was of no significance. In 
particular the court relied upon the fact that defendant with 
eight loaded cartridges remaining in his rifle stopped firing 
when the deceased stopped advancing toward him and that 
he then permitted the decf'ased to turn and walk away. In 
the present case, on the contrary, defendant did not terminate 
his attack on his wife after he had sufficiently disabled her 
so that he would be free to leave as he testified he wanted 
to do, but continued the attack until it culminated in her 
strangulation. Under these circumstances we cannot say 
as a matter of law that the threats were of no significance. 
_ The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, 
J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the affirmance of the judgment 
of conviction. Certainly, Caldwell's threats to take Lily's 
life, followed by his killing of her, give rise to an inference 
that the murder was premeditated. In my opinion, however, 
that conclusion is inconsistent with People v. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d 
59 [153 P.2d 21], where the defendant made similar threats 
before taking the life of his victim. The Holt case is dis-
tinguished upon the ground that, after firing the lethal bullet, 
Holt "with eight loaded cartridges remaining in his rifle 
stopped firing . . . and . . . permitted the deceased to turn 
and walk away." But evidence of the activities of the ac-
cused after he shot the victim or inflicted a lethal blow, to 
the extent that it bears at all upon the question of premedi-
tation, could create only a conflict. 
In view of the present decision, the Holt case should be 
overruled. 
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